



# Preparing for the black swans of resistance

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# Disclosures



**Consult / advisory** – Achaogen, Adenium, Allecra, AstraZeneca, Basilea, BioVersys, Centauri, McKinsey, Meiji, Merck, Nordic, Roche, Shionogi, TAXIS, Tetrphase, VenatoRx, Wockhardt, Zambon, Zealand

**Lectures** – Astellas, AstraZeneca, Cardiome, Beckman-Coulter, Cepheid, Nordic, Merck/MSD, Pfizer

**Sponsored research** – Achaogen, AstraZeneca, Meiji, Melinta, Merck, Roche, Tetrphase, Wockhardt

**Shareholdings** – Dechra, GSK, Merck, Perkin Elmer, Pfizer amounting to <10% of portfolio value

# And occasionally I'm asked to foretell the future



**Brokers & marketing divisions want to project sales, asking**


- What % of *Klebsiella* will have carbapenemases in 2020?
- Will KPC go up as ESBLs did after 2003?
- 'Will KPC spread in Germany, France like in Italy?

**UK Dept of Health Elicitation, 'roulette method' with 10 chips to spread on a probability scale in response to questions**

- 'Do I think pan-resistant gram-negatives will emerge? Persist? Accumulate? By how much? In 5 or 20 years?


**The easy response is to extrapolate past trends into the future**

# Carbapenemase producing Enterobacteria referred to PHE





PHE data on file


# Deaths due to antimicrobial resistance by 2050



# Black Swans



# Long-Term Capital Management



2 Nobel laureates in economics on the board

Exploited pricing anomalies between long- & short-dated bonds

Anomalies are tiny, so need to borrow heavily & invest huge sums

Caught out when Asian financial crisis of 1998 fundamentally changed the relative pricing of long and short dated securities



# Jesse Livermore, Bethlehem Steel, & the Lusitania Break, 1915



- 'War Speciality Stock'; steel & shipbuilding
- 7 Apr – Breaks \$87 –previous high - nears \$100 'trigger' point
- 8 Apr – Buys 500 at \$98 to \$99; price runs to \$117
  - 13 Apr –\$145, 'Had my stake'
  - Not going to make fortune on 500 shares'
  - Uses shares as collateral to buy more
- 7 May – Steel at \$159... Germany U-boat torpedoes *Lusitania*
- 8 May - \$130..... 'got me in the solar plexus'





# How bacterial evolution proceeds



- Periods of accumulation; reflects use/infection control
- Mutant selection; predictable, reflects usage
  - AmpC mutants in cephalosporin  $R_x$  of *Enterobacter* infection
  - Imipenem  $R_x$  of *P. aeruginosa* infection
- Escape of new genes to mobile DNA; unpredictable
  - Black swan events
  - Occasional massive shifts— if the ‘new’ mobile gene spread or associates with ‘fit’ clone(s)

# Gene escapes that changed the rules



Before		Reached	Source
1961	<i>mecA</i>	<i>S. aureus</i>	Rare <i>Staph</i> spp.
1965	<i>bla</i> <sub>TEM</sub>	Enterobacteriaceae / other G-ves	???
	<i>erm</i>	Staph and Strep	<i>Streptomyces</i>
Various	<i>aac</i> , <i>aph</i> , <i>ant</i> , <i>ArmA</i>	All	<i>Streptomyces</i>
1986	VanA/VanB	Enterococci (Staph)	
1987	<i>bla</i> <sub>CTX-M</sub>	Enterobacteriaceae	<i>Kluyvera</i>
1997	<i>bla</i> <sub>KPC</sub>	Enterobacteriaceae / other G-ves	???
1990s	<i>bla</i> <sub>OXA-23</sub>	<i>A. baumannii</i>	<i>A. radioresistens</i>
1999	<i>bla</i> <sub>OXA-48</sub>	Enterobacteriaceae / other G-ves	<i>Shewenella</i>
2006	<i>bla</i> <sub>NDM</sub>	Enterobacteriaceae / other G-ves	???
2011	<i>mcr1</i>	Enterobacteriaceae	<i>Moraxella?</i>


# Black swans that've bitten me



**Early years teaching ...**  
*'Vancomycin attacks a substrate, not an enzyme,'*  
so you won't get resistance

**2 Post doc years,** studying impermeability in *P. aeruginosa*, which turned out to be efflux

# 3-gen ceph resistance in bloodstream *E. coli*, PHE



## We rationalise what did happen; but history could have unfolded differently



## We know what resistance genes have escaped

- We don't know all those that haven't but could have done
  - Nor if they'll escape in future...

## We know what DID happen, 1914-18 War

- Franz Ferdinand shot in Sarajevo; route through town had been changed after first assassination attempt, driver not told
  - Suppose driver had followed the correct route; what then?
- Churchill, Hitler fought on Western Front and survived
  - Suppose either hadn't; what then?


# What can we expect next



- Some existing resistance up-trends will continue
  - Especially if antibiotic use is heavy & infection control poor
- Stewardship and infection control will have successes
  - But infection control difficult if resistance has spread to community
  - Success of stewardship IN REDUCING RESISTANCE unpredictable
- Resistance mutations to new  $\beta$ -lactamase inhibitor combos

***And new black swans will take flight***

# Ceftazidime-avibactam, 207 referred KPC Enterobacteriaceae, Year from July 2015



138 *Klebsiella*, 33 *E. coli*; 30 *Enterobacter/Citrobacter*; 6 others



# MICs (mg/L) CAZ-AVI- *bla*<sub>KPC</sub> mutants: avibactam combinations



Single & multi-step mutants (X+Y)	CAZ-AVI 4 mg/L		Ceftaroline -AVI 4 mg/L	
	Parent	Mutants	Parent	Mutants
<i>Klebsiella</i>				
NCTC13438 (29+2)	1	4-128	0.5	0.5-8
H...643 (24+6)	1	8-128	1	0.5-4
<i>Enterobacter</i>				
H...226 (28+5)	0.5	4-128	0.5	1-8
H...216 (7+0)	0.25	8-64	0.5	0.5-2

13/14 mutants sequenced had changes to *bla*<sub>KPC</sub>, mostly around Ω loop

# Ceftazidime-avibactam vs. Carbapenem-R Enterobacteriaceae



## University of Pittsburgh, consecutive CAZ-AVI patients

- 37 carbapenem-R; 31 with KPC; 31 *Klebsiella*
- Various infections: 12 pneumonias, 10 bacteraemias
- Clinical cure = 67%
- 90-day survival = 62%
- Microbiological failure = 10 (27%)
- **3 KPC cases with resistance selected (MICs 64-128 mg/L)**

# AmpC changes selected in ceftolozane/tazo R<sub>x</sub>





	PA105A	PA147A	109-E9	110-G8	101-E5	103-H8
Ceftolozane-tazo	1	≥64	2	32	2	≥32
Ceftazidime	4	≥32	32	64	16	64
C'taz-avibactam	4	≥32	4	32	4	≥32
Piperacillin/tazo	16	64	64	16	64	32
Meropenem	8	8	8	4	8	16
Imipenem	≥32	1	16	2	16	4
Gentamicin	2	8	-	-	-	-
Ciprofloxacin	≥8	≥8	≥32	≥32	≥32	≥32
Colistin	1	1	-	-	-	-
Rx for	Wound, 6 weeks		RTI, 2 weeks		RTI, 10 days	
Change	Gly183Asp		Deletion 229-247		Glu247Lys	

# Screening 480 soil streptomycetes



	Resistant (n)	Tested for inactivation (n)	Able to inactivate (n)
Cephalexin	442	16	3
Ciprofloxacin	52	52	0
Clindamycin	107	46	0
<b>Daptomycin</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>64</b>
Erythromycin	128	128	9
Novobiocin	12	12	0
Rifampicin	49	49	20
Synercid	294	71	14
<b>Telithromycin</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>4</b>
Trimethoprim	478	80	0
Vancomycin	5	5	0

# Glycosylation of telithromycin by a soil streptomycete



A critical' escape would be a carbapenemase  
that became 'comfortable' in a fit *E. coli* strain

... like CTX-M-15 ESBL in ST131

But suppose instead we get a plasmid-  
borne  $\beta$ -lactam-resistant PBP3





# UK ref lab sees 1-3 *Klebsiella* per week like this



	MIC (mg/L) or behaviour
Cefotaxime	2
Ceftazidime	32
Cefepime	64
Pip-tazo	>64
Ertapenem	>16
Imipenem/meropenem	16
Aztreonam	4
Ceph-clav synergy	No
Ceph-cloxacillin synergy	No
Carbapenem-EDTA synergy	No
Hodge bioassay with cephs or carbapenems	No activity seen

Genomic sequencing only found SHV-1 & porin loss

Convinced ourselves - efflux or permeability

Added ceftazidime-avibactam to panel... 16-fold synergy seen

# O'Neill Commission – key recommendations on resistance



- Public education
- More use of diagnostics
- Less use of antibiotics in agriculture
- ‘Market entry rewards’ for new antibiotics:
  - .....we need e.g. G20 to get together and reward developers of new antibiotics after approval for use.....
  - .... c. \$1 bn each given to the developers of successful new drugs, if not ‘over-marketed’ and yet available to patients who need them
- ..... Picking winners.....

# Which 'winner' would you pick?



**In the 1980s would you have rewarded:**

- Cefotaxime – 100-fold lower MICs than earlier cephs
- Ceftriaxone – like cefotaxime but more convenient
- Ceftazidime – added *P. aeruginosa* to ceph. spectrum
- Cefsulodin – narrow spectrum antipseudomonal
- Imipenem – AmpC/ESBL stable
- Aztreonam – MBL stable... unimportant then!

**Best answers only clear in retrospect**

**..... & may change with time...**

# Which answer to the 'MBL threat' would you reward?



- MBL-stable monobactam + BLI
  - Aztreonam-avibactam
- MBL-labile  $\beta$ -lactam + triple action diazabicyclooctane
  - Cefepime-zidebactam; meropenem(?)-nacubactam
- MBL-labile  $\beta$ -lactam + boronate
  - Cefepime-VNRX-5133
- Broadly- $\beta$ -lactamase (inc. MBL)- stable  $\beta$ -lactams
  - Cefiderocol, monobactam LYS228

And maybe MBLs don't cause resistance so effectively *in vivo*?

# In a world of change



- Spread risk
- Favour diversity
- Don't think you're clever enough to pick winners
  - Time and experience will choose them

# Picking avibactam's partner: ceftazidime or cefepime?



## Ceftazidime favoured because:

- Licensed, familiar, used in more countries
- Lower MICs for *P. aeruginosa*
- Published concerns of cefepime efficacy
  - Later deemed misplaced

# Was ceftazidime the right partner choice?



- Cefepime-AVI MICs 4-fold lower than CAZ-AVI
- KPC enzyme mutate to become better ceftazidimases
  - Confer CAZ-AVI resistance
  - Cefepime MICs tend to fall, not to rise
- AmpC can mutate in the lab, conferring CAZ-AVI-resistance
  - Cefepime is more stable to AmpC



# *'Was ceftazidime the right partner'* = WRONG QUESTION



- We are learning the threats to CAZ / AVI
  - We don't know cefepime/AVI's vulnerabilities.....
- The rise of MBLs prompted devt of aztreonam / AVI
  - But aztreonam/AVI is 3-4 years behind CAZ/AVI
  - Meantimes docs co-administering aztreonam plus CAZ/AVI

Wenzler *et al.*, *DMID* 2017; **88**: 352  
Jayol *et al.*, *JAC* 2017 epub  
Shaw *et al.* *JAC* 2017 epub

# A better model for $\beta$ -lactamase inhibitors?



- Once we know an inhibitor works *in vivo* and is safe from one large trial with one partner....
- **Then**
  - Small trials with multiple partners targeted on infections due to bacteria with relevant  $\beta$ -lactamases
  - In 1980s, sulbactam licensed alone in Germany & France

# Ceftazidime/avibactam in two Phase III trials



Ceftazidime/ avibactam arm	cIAI	cUTI
Ceftazidime-S	289	311
Ceftazidime-R	47	75

& trial patients cost \$100,000 each....

Mazuki *et al.*, *CID* 2016; **62**: 1380


Wagenlehner *et al.*, *CID* 2016; **63**: 754

# Vancomycin & colistin



- Vancomycin licensed 1955; colistin 1958
- Vancomycin for endocarditis: 6-patient trial
- Swiftly superseded by better / less toxic agents
- Kept available despite minimal market

# Vancomycin use, US, UK, France, Germany, Italy & Netherlands



# Agents that go nowhere for years



- \$1 bn Market entry rewards won't go down well
  - 'Taxpayers funded never-used, toxic antibiotic'\*
- ? Restricted license on limited trial data
- ? Longer patent
- ? Pay to keep available

**Arab proverb: *He who predicts the future lies, even if he tells the truth***



***We know only that resistance will throw up new challenges***

***In a world of uncertainty, future robustness lies in diversity***

- Don't think you're clever enough to reliably pick winners
- Encourage innovation with early stage funding, spread widely
- Adapt regulations to encourage multiple antibiotics to market
- Favour small informative clinical trials vs. resistant pathogens
- Restrictive licenses with long patents to encourage stewardship

Max Planck Inst for the Study of Societies Discussion Paper 16/6

# Uncertainty and the Dangers of Monocultures in Regulation, Analysis, and Practice

Richard Bronk & Wade Jacoby



Uncertainty is endemic to innovative economies and complex societies, but policymakers underestimate how damaging this is for many of their guiding assumptions. In particular, the discourse of best practice, “global solutions for global problems,” and regulatory harmonization becomes questionable when there is substantial uncertainty about the future. This uncertainty makes it impossible to know what best practice *will* be and increases the danger that harmonization will result in highly correlated errors and shared analytical blind spots. The transnational harmonization of regulation has well-known advantages, but – especially in technocratic policy areas – also creates vulnerability to unexpected challenges by constraining how we *think* as well as homogenizing how we *act*. Faced with uncertainty, policymakers should be wary of monocultures in regulation, analysis, and practice, and instead focus on *managing* policy diversity to limit its costs.